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ESSAY
Feminism and International Law: A Reply
FERNANDO R. TES6N*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, legal scholars have extended feminist
theory to many areas of the law, and legal discourse has been enriched
by feminist jurisprudence. Until recently, however, international law
had not undergone a sustained feminist critique. This gap is now
slowly being filled; a notable contribution to that effort is a recent
article by Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley
Wright.'
This Essay presents a reply to the Charlesworth-Chinkin-Wright
critique. Although much of this reply engages more general issues in
feminist theory, it would be impossible, within the scope of this work,
to address every important political, cultural, biological, epistemologi-
cal, and metaphysical issue raised by the various feminist critiques of
traditional jurisprudence. I therefore confine the analysis to argu-
ments directly relevant to international law, focusing on the analogies
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University. The article is adapted from my book.
Fernando R. Tes6n, The Philosophy of International Law (forthcoming 1994). Research for
this article was supported by the summer research program at Arizona State Univerity College
of Law. Many thanks to Lea Brilmayer and to the participants of the International
Jurisprudence Colloquium at the New York University School of Law. Many thanks also to
Jeff Murphy and Cynthia Ward, who made very useful comments to an earlier draft.
Copyright © Fernando R. Tes6n 1992. Do not cite or otherwise use without permission.
1. See Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 Am. J.
Int'l L. 613 (1991). The article won the Francis Deik Prize.
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and contrasts between the differing feminist approaches to interna-
tional law and the Kantian theory of international law defended in my
previous writings.2
The feminist critique of international law contains many disparate
strands of theory that must be disentangled. A central difficulty with
the article by Charlesworth and her associates is that it conflates
divergent arguments from very different (and often irreconcilable)
camps within feminist theory. The most important such mismatch is
between liberal and radical feminism, which coexist in uneasy tension
throughout the article. Much of the analysis in this essay is therefore
devoted to separating, analyzing, and ultimately evaluating these
interwoven but uncongenial threads of feminist thought.3
In examining the liberal and radical feminist approaches to interna-
tional law, as manifested in the Charlesworth article, I distinguish
three different levels of criticism. The first level concerns the processes
of international lawmaking, the second addresses the content of inter-
national law, and the third attempts to derive a critical theory from
the (purported) "nature" or "inherent qualities" of liberal interna-
tional legal institutions. These critiques are treated differently, in
complex ways, by radical and liberal feminism. Yet on all three criti-
cal dimensions, my conclusion is the same: although liberal feminism
has important things to say about international law and relations, rad-
ical feminism is inconsistent both with the facts and with a view of
international law rooted in human rights and respect for persons.
II. KANTIAN LIBERALISM AND FEMINISM
Liberal, or Kantian, international legal theory is founded on the
idea of the individual as rational and autonomous. Liberal theorists
2. See Fernando R. Tes6n, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and Morality
(1988) [hereinafter Humanitarian Intervention]; Fernando R. Tes6n, International Obligation
and the Theory of Hypothetical Consent, 15 Yale J. Int'l L. 84 (1990) [hereinafter
International Obligation]; Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92
Colum. L. Rev. 53 (1992) [hereinafter The Kantian Theory]. Throughout this article I
interchangeably refer to this view as the Kantian, human-rights, or liberal theory of
international law.
3. There are other schools of thought within the feminist movement. Particularly
noteworthy is relational, or cultural, feminism, inspired by Carol Gilligan. Carol Gilligan, In
A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (1982); see also Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev.
543 (1986). In this article, however, I will discuss only liberal and radical feminism, in part
because they seem to me the two alternatives that are truly irreconcilable. Moreover,
Charlesworth and her associates do not rely on relational feminism as part of their critique of
international law. Cf. Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 615-16 (discussing sympathetically
Gilligan's work but refusing to adopt the "different voice" premise).
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regard individuals as capable of rational choices, possessed of inherent
dignity, and worthy of respect.4 Liberal states in international rela-
tions, or members of the liberal alliance, are those nation-states with
democratically elected officials, where human rights are generally
respected. Liberal internationalism assumes a right to democratic
governance, and holds that a state may not discriminate against indi-
viduals, including women.5 This principle is, of course, a centerpiece
of the international law of human rights.6 A corollary of the Kantian
thesis is that illegitimate governments may not be embraced as mem-
bers of the liberal alliance.7
Liberal feminists rely on liberal principles of domestic and interna-
tional law to end abuses against women. Very succinctly, liberal femi-
nism is the view that women are unjustly treated, that their rights are
violated, and that political reform is needed to improve their situa-
tion, thereby allowing them to exercise autonomous choices and enjoy
full equal status as free citizens in a liberal democracy.8 The gov-
erning international principles are the imperatives of human rights,
nondiscrimination, and equal opportunity for women, as envisioned
in articles 1(3), 8, and 55 of the United Nations Charter.9 When a
state discriminates or deprives women of these human rights, it com-
mits an injustice, a violation of international human rights law for
which it is responsible.10
Radical feminists agree with liberal feminists that the situation of
women must be improved. They believe, however, that liberal institu-
tions are themselves but tools of gender oppression, and that women
are exploited by men in even the least suspecting ways." Radical
4. See The Kantian Theory, supra note 2, at 62-66.
5. See generally Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
Am. J. Int'l L. 46 (1992).
6. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
adopted Dec. 18, 1979, arts. 7-8, 19 I.L.M. 33 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter
Women's Convention]; Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature
Mar. 31, 1953, arts. 1-3, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force July 7. 1954);
Inter-American Convention on Granting of Political Rights to Women, opened for signature
May 2, 1948, art. 1, 27 U.S.T. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 8365 (entered into force Mar. 17, 1949).
7. See The Kantian Theory, supra note 2, at 69-72.
8. For a useful survey of liberal feminism, see Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and
Human Nature 27 and passim (1983). For two excellent examples of modern liberal feminist
scholarship, see Susan Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice, in
Feminism and Political Theory 15 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 1990); Diana T. Meyers Personal
Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization, 84 J. Phil. 619 (1987).
9. U.N. Charter arts. 1(3), 8, 55.
10. Id.
11. For examples of characteristic radical feminist legal theory, see Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (1987) [hereinafter Feminism Unmodified]; Catharine A.
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feminists believe that existing states are hierarchically structured
according to gender, and that gender hierarchy necessarily infects the
process of legal reasoning itself.'2 Radical feminists hold that the
"actual choices" of women only seem to be autonomous and free; in
reality they are socially determined. Human beings are not, as liberals
would have it, separate, rational entities capable of individual deci-
sion-making, but rather beings to some degree defined and determined
by their social-and particularly gender-relationships. 3 Under rad-
ical feminist theory, no woman is truly free, not even in the "freest" of
societies.
III. THREE FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In light of the differences in feminist theory it will be convenient to
set forth three feminist critiques of international law, and the central
claim associated with each: (A) the processes of international lawmak-
ing exclude women; (B) the content of international law privileges
men to the detriment of women; and (C) international law, as a patri-
archal institution, inherently oppresses women, marginalizes their
interests, and submerges their experiences and perspectives. I will
address each of these critiques in turn.
A. The Processes of International Lawmaking Exclude Women
Feminists criticize the international lawmaking process for depriv-
ing women of the access and opportunity to take part in lawmaking in
two important ways. First, feminists argue that women are under-
represented in international relations, that is, in high positions in
international organizations, in diplomatic services, and as heads of
state and government.' 4 Second, they contend that because of this
underrepresentation, the creation of international law is reserved
almost exclusively to men. Women are thus effectively prevented
from participating in the processes of international lawmaking.' 5
MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (1989) [hereinafter Toward a Feminist
Theory]; Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, in Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law
and Gender 201 (Katherine T. Bartlett & Roseanne Kennedy eds., 1991). One of the boldest
claims of some radical feminists is that sexuality is socially determined. See Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Desire and Power, in Feminism Unmodified, supra [hereinafter Desire and
Power]; West, supra, at 202.
12. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
Feminism Unmodified, supra note 11, at 40 [hereinafter Difference and Dominance].
13. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and
American Law 194 (1990).
14. Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 622.
15. Id.
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Central to the claim of exclusion is the fact that women are under-
represented in international relations. There is no doubt that there
are relatively few women heads of state, diplomats, or international
organizations officials. 16 Is this state of things, however, an injustice?
And how can the statistical underrepresentation (whether or not it is
an injustice) be redressed? It is useful, in addressing these issues, to
distinguish, first, between legitimate and illegitimate governments,
and second, between governments and international organizations.
Let us consider first the case of illegitimate, undemocratic govern-
ments.17 Plainly, it does not make sense to criticize a dictator, say, for
not appointing enough women to his government or diplomatic corps.
To do so would constitute a contextual category mistake: blaming a
dictator who has taken and held power by means of torture and mur-
der for not appointing a woman as ambassador to the United Nations
is like blaming a burglar ransacking our home at gunpoint for not
having asked our permission to use the telephone. The normative
context of a burglary is one in which it does not make sense to insist
on compliance with the norms of courtesy. Likewise, the normative
context of a tyrannical state is one in which it does not make sense to
ask the tyrant to appoint more women (or men, or blacks, or
Catholics). 18
In such a case, the government is illegitimate in the first place, so its
appointments are morally invalid regardless of the sex of the appoin-
tees. If an illegitimate government consists of a group of men system-
atically excluding women, this is of course an injustice, but it is one
that is subordinated to the greater injustice of tyranny, which by defi-
nition includes the illegitimacy of origin and the violation of human
rights. It is true that discriminating against women aggravates the
injustice of tyranny; it therefore makes sense to put pressure on all
governments to refrain from sexist practices. The analysis, however,
does not work the other way round: tyranny is not cured by the
tyrant's celebration of diversity, as it were. Even in cases where
human rights abuses (other than exclusion from government) are pri-
marily directed at women, suggesting that what we need is more
women as international representatives of dictators is absurd on its
face. The only remedy, here as elsewhere, is to get rid of the tyrants
and secure human rights.
16. See id. at 16 n.56.
17. By illegitimate governments I mean governments that do not respect basic human rights
and are, for that reason, unrepresentative. The Kantian Theory, supra note 2, at 60-74.
18. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind 16-18 (1949) (introducing the concept of category
mistakes).
1993]
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Put differently, in a tyrannical state the agency relationship between
people and government, the vertical social contract, has broken
down."9 Therefore, the tyrant cannot legitimately address the ques-
tion of the sex of his political appointees because he does not represent
anybody. The women he decides to appoint to office to achieve gen-
der balance are likewise blighted by the original illegitimacy. A par-
tial reply to the complaint by Charlesworth and her associates about
women's being underrepresented in international relations, then, is
that it is not sensible to start addressing that issue globally without
addressing also the issue of democratic legitimacy.
More interesting is the case of full members of the liberal alliance,
states with democratically elected officials where human rights are
generally respected. Assuming a right to democratic governance,2 a
state may not discriminate against women in their exercise of that
right.2 The governing principle, then, is the imperative of nondis-
crimination and equal opportunity for women, along the lines sug-
gested by the pertinent international instruments, themselves inspired
in articles 1(3), 8, and 55 of the U.N. Charter.22 Therefore, if the
underrepresentation of women results from states' preventing them
from exercising their right to political participation, that is an injus-
tice, a violation of international human rights law for which the state
is responsible. A similar analysis holds for a state that discriminates
against women in its processes for admission to the diplomatic ser-
vice. Such discrimination is contrary to the mandates of international
human rights law.23 This conclusion follows from both liberal femi-
nism and the Kantian theory of international law.
Radical feminists, however, seem to believe that there is a global
19. See Fernando R. Tes6n, Low-Intensity Conflict and State Sovereignty: A Philosophical
Analysis, Colum. J. Transnat'l L. (forthcoming 1993).
20. See generally Franck, supra note 5.
21. See id.
22. U.N. Charter, arts. 1(3), 8, 55.
23. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights applies the test of reasonableness
and objectivity to determine whether a governmental distinction between groups is justified
under article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950); see
Belgian Linguistic (No. 2), 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) (1980) at 252; see also Marckx v.
Belgium, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) (1979) at 330. Thus, a regulation prohibiting the
government from sending a female diplomat to a country where women are much more likely
to be assaulted or killed may be justified. General discrimination against women in the
admission to the foreign service, however, is not. An interesting case is whether a government
is justified in refusing to send women diplomats to countries where host governments dislike
seeing women in any public positions primarily because they deny the women in their state
access to such positions. In principle, democratic nations should refuse to honor the illegal
discriminatory practices of other governments.
[Vol. 33:647
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injustice even where, as a result of democratic elections held in
independent, rights-respecting states, it is mostly men who are elected
to government, or if in such states mostly men traditionally seek
admission to the diplomatic service. An example is the discussion by
Charlesworth and her associates of the Women's Convention. 24 They
strongly criticize the Convention for assuming that men and women
should be treated alike, which is the liberal outlook.' The Charles-
worth view is that sexism is "a pervasive, structural problem." 6 Fur-
ther, it is male dominance which lies at the root of the structural
problem and which must be addressed as a means to reach the struc-
tural issues. But what are the authors' suggestions? If we descend
from the abstract slogan that liberal equality is just the men's measure
of things, how do they suggest rewriting each of the rights recognized
by the Convention to meet their concerns? Take article 7, for exam-
ple, which directs states to eliminate all discrimination against women
in the political and public life of the country.27 Would a radical femi-
nist rewriting of this article require states to appoint women, regard-
less of popular vote?28 Would it impose a 50% gender quota for
elected positions, or force women who do not want to run for office to
do so?29 These are not just rhetorical questions: given the radical fem-
24. Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 631-34.
25. Id. at 631-32.
26. Id. at 632 (citing Difference and Dominance, supra note 12, at 34 ("[Man has become
the measure of all things")).
27. See Women's Convention, supra note 6, art. 7.
28. This sort of global affirmative action suggestion is untenable and impracticable. The
problem with such a global requirement becomes quickly apparent. Imagine the United
Nations requiring a country preparing to hold a democratic election to choose a female
president, under threat of sanctions. This is completely different from the question of the
permissibility under international law of domestic affirmative action programs designed to
redress de facto inequalities of women. See Women's Convention, supra note 6, art. 4
(allowing temporary affirmative action programs provided they do not result in states
maintaining separate standards). Whatever the laws of individual states on this issue,
international law allows for such programs through the margin of appreciation left to states, at
least when the programs are not extreme.
29. Cf. Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 623 (discussing the 50% figure for "professional
jobs held by women" in international organizations and agencies). Interestingly, the authors
use expressions such as the "silence" or "invisibility" of women instead of the term "injustice."
Id. Analogous criticism was heard in the United States during the recent Clarence Thomas
hearings when critics pointed out that the Senate Judiciary Committee was made up entirely of
white males and that the U.S. Senate itself was 98% male. Whatever the other faults of the
individual senators involved or the hearings might have been, this criticism is misguided. Each
participating senator had perfectly democratic credentials, having been elected to the Senate by
a free democratic choice of the electorate. I cannot, therefore, see any real injustice, unless
feminists are suggesting that women are being prevented from voting. It is also unclear how
radical feminists intend to address this problem. A perfectly sensible way would be to mobilize
the electorate to get more women elected (politically, this requires convincing voters that the
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inists' rejection of rights discourse and formal political equality, it is
difficult to imagine what a radical list of international women's rights
would look like.
That said, the Kantian theory of international law does not pre-
clude domestic electoral arrangements designed to heighten the
probability of electing women in a given state. This is no different
from gerrymandering for the purpose of strengthening the vote of
minorities or other groups in some states.30 Here again, international
law cannot go beyond mandating democratic governance and nondis-
crimination in a general way. Local conditions will vary, and in states
where women have been previously excluded from politics it may be
permissible and desirable to adopt preferential electoral arrange-
ments. Such measures, when properly tailored, do not do violence to
the international law principle of nondiscrimination and the right of
all citizens to participate in public life.
This analysis holds with even more force for the permanent staffs of
international organizations. There would be nothing wrong with the
United Nations, for example, attempting to achieve a gender balance
in the composition of its administrative staff, much in the way the
organization attempts to maintain a geographical and even ideological
balance.3' In this case there is no competing legitimate sovereignty
principle, and the organization would not be impairing individual or
collective choices in legitimate states (i.e., liberal democracies) 32 if it
attempted to hire officials under such a scheme.
In sum, imposing on states the duties of nondiscrimination and
equal opportunity, including affirmative measures where appropriate,
is the only way to redress the underrepresentation of women as state
agents consistent with full respect for democratic and individual
choices.33 Likewise, in international organizations it may make sense,
depending on the circumstances (past discrimination, goals of the
organization), to push to achieve a gender balance in the composition
of the organization's personnel.
candidate's sex is an important consideration). The impracticality of other alternatives, such as
a constitutional amendment imposing a 50% quota for women in the Senate, is self-evident.
30. I am indebted to Lea Brilmayer for calling my attention to this point.
31. Thus, Charlesworth and her associates seem to be correct on this point. Charlesworth
et al., supra note 1, at 625.
32. Again, I purposefully confine this discussion to legitimate states, because in my view
envoys of illegitimate governments should not be allowed to represent their states, come what
may. See The Kantian Theory, supra note 2, at I00 (recommending that the United Nations
require democratic legitimacy of representatives before admitting them to the organization).
33. Radical feminists do not accept even the possibility of free individual or collective
choice in today's society. I address this issue below. See discussion infra § III(C)(2).
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B. The Content of the Rules of International Law
In addition to criticizing the processes of international lawmaking,
many feminists argue that the content of international law privileges
men to the detriment of women. 34 The claim that the content of inter-
national law favors the interests of men may incorporate either or
both of the following arguments: first, international law rules in gen-
eral are "gendered" to privilege men;35 and second, international rules
such as sovereign equality and nonintervention protect states, and
states are instrumental in disadvantaging or oppressing women. 6
The latter claim, in turn, may intend either or both of the following:
first, international law is too tolerant of violations of women's rights
by governments;37 and second, international law is too tolerant of vio-
lations of the rights of women by private individuals within states,
such as physical abuse by men in the home.3 8
1. "Gendered" Rules
In response to the first point, I find little plausibility in the claim of
some feminists that the specific content of international law rules sys-
tematically privileges men. Positive international law is a vast and
heterogeneous system consisting of principles, rules, and standards of
varying degrees of generality, many of a technical nature. Rules such
as the principle of territoriality in criminal jurisdiction, or the rule
that third states should in principle have access to the surplus of the
entire allowable catch of fish in a coastal state's exclusive economic
zone are not "thoroughly gendered" 39 but, on the contrary, gender-
neutral. It cannot be seriously maintained that such norms operate
overtly or covertly to the detriment of women. The same can be said
of the great bulk of international legal rules.'
2. Overprotecting States
Feminists are correct, however, on their second claim that interna-
34. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 625.
35. Id. at 621-22.
36. Id. at 622 (citing Betty Reardon, Sexism and the War System 15 (1985)).
37. Charlesworth and her associates do not make this point expressly. See infra notes 72-
75. For an account of violations of women's rights, see generally Amnesty International,
Women in the Front Line: Human Rights Violations Against Women (1991).
38. Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 629.
39. Id. at 614 (stating that "[i]nternational law is a thoroughly gendered system").
40. By the assertion that international law rules are gendered, feminists, especially radical
feminists, may also mean that in virtue merely of being part of the liberal state system,
international law rules are bound up with patriarchy, and therefore inherently oppress women.
This line of reasoning is considered and rejected in § III(C)(l).
1993]
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tional law overprotects states and governments. International law, as
traditionally understood, is formulated in exaggeratedly statist terms.
Statism, the doctrine that state sovereignty is the foundational con-
cept of international law, repudiates the central place accorded to the
individual in any liberal normative theory; and, by extension, it often
results in ignoring the rights and interests of women within states.
This criticism is identical to the one made by the Kantian theory of
international law.4" The Kantian thesis insists upon disfranchising
illegitimate governments, that is, governments that fail to respect
basic human rights and are unrepresentative. 42 Likewise, there is lit-
tle doubt that the government of a state that denies women status as
equal citizens is illegitimate, just as the apartheid regime in South
Africa is (or was) illegitimate.43 Feminists are right in challenging
statism.
On the other hand, radical feminists also attack liberalism. Insofar
as this attack is predicated on the perception that liberal philosophy
and the liberal state oppress women, it must be met with a philosophi-
cal and political defense of the liberal vision. But if the feminist
attack on liberalism is predicated on the belief that statism, as an
assumption of international law, is necessarily entailed by liberalism,
the answer is simply that this is a mistaken inference. Statism is at
odds with liberalism. The human rights theory of international law
(certainly the most liberal international legal theory) rejects statism
because it protects illegitimate governments and is thus an illiberal
theory of international law.' The whole point of the liberal theory of
international law is to challenge absolute sovereignty as an anti-
quated, authoritarian doctrine inhospitable to the aspirations of
human rights and democratic legitimacy.45
Liberal feminism and the Kantian theory of international law join
41. I developed this thesis in The Kantian Theory, supra note 2; see also International
Obligation, supra note 2.
42. The Kantian Theory, supra note 2.
43. An example is a state where the government enforces a religious code reserving a
subordinate status for women. See generally Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam:
Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (1992); Fatima Mernissi, The Veil and the Male Elite: A
Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam (1991).
44. See generally International Obligation, supra note 2.
45. Feminists here make the same mistake as critical legal scholars in confusing legal
formalism (which certainly international legal discourse inherited from Western legal thought)
with liberal political philosophy, which need not (and should not) endorse a legal formalism
devoid of moral content. Liberals do believe in formal constraints of rational discourse, but
their political philosophy is built around the substantive Kantian notion of the inherent equal
worth of persons and their entitlement to equal respect and basic human rights. See, e.g., The
Kantian Theory, supra note 2.
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in rejecting statism. Indeed, one of the most valuable contributions of
feminist international legal theory is the attempt to disaggregate
states, to pierce the sovereignty veil and inquire about real social rela-
tions, relations among individuals and between individuals and gov-
ernment within the state. This is also the thrust of the Kantian theory
of international law. 6 When the veil of state sovereignty is lifted,
liberal feminists find that women are unfairly treated (i.e, their rights
are violated) in most or all states. This injustice is compounded by
the fact that it often takes place in spheres shielded from the reach of
domestic and international law.
a. Rights Violations by Governments
Beneath the sovereignty veil, two different situations become rele-
vant: violation of women's rights by the government, and violation of
women's rights by private persons; notably, abuse by men in the home
and the workplace. From the standpoint of the international law of
human rights, the violation of women's rights by governments does
not present difficulties distinct from the violation of other human
rights.4 7 Liberal and radical feminists are at one here in condemning
discrimination against women. Discrimination is a violation of inter-
national human rights law for which the state is internationally
responsible.48
b. Rights Violations by Private Parties
The violation of women's rights by private persons or groups raises
more difficult issues because, as feminists rightly point out, the bound-
aries between public and private action are blurred. Indeed, radical
feminists contend that the very distinction between public or state
action and private action is indefensible because it is male biased and
harmful to women. I discuss below the broader implications of the
feminist critique of the public-private distinction.49
It will be convenient here to treat separately what seems to me one
of feminism's most persuasive points: the modem state affords exces-
sive legal protection to the family."0 Family "autonomy," as the legal
46. See sources cited supra note 2.
47. See Laura Reanda, Human Rights and Women's Rights: The United Nations
Approach, 3 Hum. Rts. Q. 11 (1981). See generally Malvina Halberstam & Elizabeth F.
Defeis, Women's Legal Rights: International Covenants an Alternative to ERA? (1987).
48. For further discussion of governments' violations of women's rights, see infra
§ III(B)(2)(c).
49. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in
1993]
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basis of the private social domain, has legitimized the domination of
women and children by men. This oppression ranges from outright
brutality to subtler ways of socializing women within the family; for
example, by more or less coercively convincing women that their
place is in the home, and thus preventing them from pursuing other
options.
For some feminists, the fact that the family is legally treated as a
semi-enclosed unit to a greater extent than other legal relationships,
and the fact that modem governments are, consequently, slow in
intervening in internal family affairs, make states, in different degrees,
accomplices in this injustice. International law, in turn, protects states
by imposing a strong duty of nonintervention in internal matters.5 1
So there are two layers of legal immunity enjoyed by men who
oppress women: domestic law, which treats the family as the man's
castle; and international law, which likewise leaves the state (with its
many men's castles) largely shielded from external scrutiny.
I think that feminists, radical and liberal, are right in decrying the
excessive prerogatives enjoyed by men within the family. The law
should punish the victimization of women, and culprits should not be
allowed to hide behind the "family unit," a politically defined space
where men may unjustly dominate and sometimes even victimize
women and children. Toleration of this sort of abuse does not, how-
ever, arise from liberalism, for group autonomy (state sovereignty,
family autonomy) is an illiberal notion. Kantian liberalism insists
that our moral principles derive from individual dignity and auton-
omy. Every person holds individual rights which are not forfeited by
membership in the family group. Therefore, a liberal state must rec-
ognize and enforce the rights of women and children within the fam-
ily and protect their rights. Just as the principle of state sovereignty
must be set aside to protect citizens whose rights are violated by their
government, so the principle of family autonomy must be set aside to
protect the rights of members of the family.2
At this point, the international lawyer may raise an objection. Why
cannot domestic law address the question of abuse of women? Why
should international law provide a remedy for the acts of private indi-
Feminism Unmodified, supra note 11, at 93, 100-02 [hereinafter Privacy v. Equality]
(maintaining that the law of privacy, conceived as promoting women's bodily autonomy,
paradoxically protects activities tending toward the subjection of women).
51. See Charlesworth, supra note 1, at 625, 627.
52. Cf. Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 2 (presenting the thesis that, normatively,
governments may justifiably provide aid to individuals being deprived of their basic human
rights in other countries).
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viduals?5 3 Surely many offenses (e.g., murder or rape), heinous as
they are, are not criminalized by international law. International law,
the traditionalist would claim, is primarily concerned with rules of
state behavior. These rules do include human rights standards, but
these standards can only be violated by state officials. Crimes com-
mitted by private individuals against their fellow citizens fall instead
within the purview of the ordinary criminal law. It is true that, in
special circumstances, certain crimes committed by private individu-
als are directly regulated by international law: piracy and genocide
are examples. Most common offenses, including men's offenses
against women, however, belong, it is argued, in the province of the
state. It is the state, through its criminal and civil legislation, that
possesses the power to prevent and redress those injustices.
This reply, however, is too hasty, because it begs the question of
why international law should be content with a few injunctions
against governmental coercion, and why it should not instead impose
some positive obligations on states to criminalize certain actions. To
take an extreme example, imagine a state where rape is not criminal-
ized. Unscrupulous men could go about taking advantage of women
and terrorizing them; everyone would live in constant fear. I am not
sure we would even call this Hobbesian jungle a state; it would cer-
tainly not be a civilized state in any meaningful sense, and it would be
ludicrous for the government to escape international scrutiny by argu-
ing that the legally permitted acts of rape are not being perpetrated by
state officials. Liberal theory must therefore postulate an affirmative
obligation in international law on the part of the state to have a rea-
sonably effective legal system in which assaults against life, physical
integrity, and property are not tolerated.54 Thus a state is in breach of
its international obligations not only if it violates human rights in the
traditional sense, but also if it fails adequately to protect its citizens-
if it fails to punish enough, as it were.
53. See, e.g., Nigel Rodley, The Evolution of the International Prohibition of Torture, in
Amnesty International, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948-1988: Human
Rights, the United Nations and Amnesty International 55, 63 (1988). Whereas private
criminal acts are handled under domestic criminal law, torture becomes a matter of
international concern generally only when a government sanctions acts by its own law
enforcement officials and personnel. Id.
54. The classic statement of the argument for criminalizing violent acts, as opposed to
making them compensable only, is Robert A. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 65-71
(1974). Nozick contends that if violent, wrongful acts were simply compensable, people would
constantly fear violence against them. Compensating for this fear would not be possible, and,
therefore, states instead forbid and punish violent acts criminally to alleviate general
apprehension. Id.
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In this regard, the case X and Y v. The Netherlands," decided in
1985 by the European Court of Human Rights, is instructive. The
litigation arose from an unintended gap in Dutch criminal procedure
which left a sixteen-year-old mentally retarded victim of rape unable
to initiate criminal proceedings.56 The legal guardian of the victim
brought the case to the Court alleging violation of her right to privacy
under article 8 of the European Convention. The applicant claimed
that the loophole in Dutch law amounted to a failure to protect the
mentally handicapped woman's right to privacy (in this case, against
sexual assault). The Dutch government responded, inter alia, that
article 8 could not be interpreted to require a state to legislate specific
rules of criminal procedure in cases where the applicant had been vic-
timized, not by state officials, but by a private individual, and where
civil remedies were available. 57 The government argued that the Con-
vention accorded to the states the task of determining the appropriate
mix of civil and criminal penalties for a wrongful act.5" Nevertheless,
the Court agreed with the applicant, reasoning that the European
Convention entailed positive as well as negative obligations on the
part of the state.5 9 The loophole in Dutch criminal law, while unin-
tentional, amounted to an omission by the Dutch state that resulted,
in this case, in the violation of the right to privacy of the applicant,
and tort remedies were insufficient. 6° The Netherlands was thus held
in breach of article 8 of the Convention and ordered to pay
reparation.6'
This decision by the oldest and most effective international human
rights court demonstrates that it is possible for international law to
mandate that states within the liberal alliance provide remedies for
violations of human rights by private individuals. The international
law of human rights need not be concerned only with direct human
rights violations by public officials. Feminists are therefore right to
criticize the international law rule of state attribution according to
which only acts by public officials implicate the international respon-
55. X and Y v. The Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8 (1985).
56. Under Dutch law, initiating criminal proceedings in statutory rape cases required the
filing of a complaint by victims over the age of 12. For victims under 12 years old, a parent
could file the complaint. Dutch law, however, had no provision allowing a parent of a
mentally incompetent victim over the age of 12 to file a complaint on the victim's behalf. See
id. at 9-10.
57. Id. at 11-12.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 13-14.
61. Id. at 16.
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sibility of the state. Such a rule does not properly protect human
rights because it does not account for the failure of states to enact or
enforce domestic legislation protecting women from abuse within the
family. To the extent that such acts of violence are treated by domes-
tic law as purely internal family matters, a state, by putting women at
an unfair risk within the home, fails to treat them with respect and
dignity and thus violates the central tenet of the Kantian theory of
international law. The state, in that case, finds itself in a situation
virtually identical to that of the Dutch government in X and Y v. The
Netherlands.62 This is not for the dubious conspiratorial reason that
the state is an inherently oppressive patriarchal entity and thus is, in
some convoluted way, an active accomplice of the wife beater, but
rather because the government has failed in its duty to protect a group
of citizens (women) against serious assault, thus putting them at an
unfair risk.
c. Government Complicity in Private Rights Violations
There are also cases where governments openly encourage or toler-
ate groups of private individuals who violate the rights of women or
other groups. In some countries, for example, religious guards patrol
the streets to ensure that women, under the threat of severe physical
punishment, abide by a set of strict rules that reinforce and help to
perpetuate women's official status as inferior citizens.63 Unlike the
Dutch case of an unintentional loophole, here the state sanctions the
inferior status of women and encourages the squads in their actions.
In such a case, the situation is even more closely analogous to direct
human rights violations by state officials.64 In both cases there is a
positive, affirmative breach of an international obligation. There is,
however, an important moral, if not legal, difference between active
governmental complicity in human rights violations by individuals
and mere negligent failure to enact appropriate protective legislation.
In the first case there might be reasons for declaring a government
morally illegitimate; in the second case the state is merely out of com-
pliance with an international obligation. Although the boundaries
between direct governmental action and mere omission may be hard
62. Id. at 8.
63. See Middle East Watch, Empty Reforms: Saudi Arabia's New Basic Laws 36-37 (1992);
cf. Amnesty International, Iran: Women Prisoners of Conscience (1990) (concerning
imprisoning Iranian women for nonviolent political activities).
64. Cf. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staffin Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.CJ. 3.
29 (May 24) (holding that the Iranian government's approval of the seizure of the U.S.
embassy makes Iran internationally responsible).
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to draw, there is nothing to prevent international law from establish-
ing standards that states must meet in the enactment and enforcement
of their criminal law.
Feminism and Kantianism thus agree that international law, in
addition to imposing traditional negative constraints on governmental
coercion, must impose affirmative duties of legislation and enforce-
ment in order to deter and punish private individuals (e.g., men in
their homes) who violate the rights of others (including, but not lim-
ited to, women).65
d. Defending the Convention Against Torture
It is in the light of these considerations that one must evaluate the
criticism of the Convention Against Torture put forth by Professor
Charlesworth and her associates. They deplore the fact that the Con-
vention is limited to official torture, that is, torture by governments or
under color of government authority.66 By imposing this require-
ment, they argue, the convention does not reach affronts to women's
dignity (e.g., battery) typically sustained by them in the home.
In one sense, this objection misses the point of the Convention. It is
one thing to assert, properly, that governments have a duty, through
legislation, to punish the violation of their citizens' physical integrity
by private individuals. It is a very different thing to imply, as the
authors seem to do, that because the Torture Convention is concerned
with official torture it therefore permits states to leave private crimes
unpunished.
Official torture is a worthy object of prohibitive legislation in its
own right, as anyone who has witnessed government oppression will
agree.68 Governments have been among history's most egregious cul-
prits in violating human rights. There is ample reason for human
rights conventions to deal specifically with official torture. There is
something particularly evil in governmental violations of human
rights, for in those cases the government has turned its awesome coer-
cive power against the very citizens who have entrusted their protec-
65. Cf. Women's Convention, supra note 6, arts. 2, 3 (mandating legislation to eliminate
gender discrimination).
66. Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 628 (citing United Nations Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46,
U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708, reprinted in 23
I.L.M. 1027 (1984), revs. reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) (opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985;
entered into force June 26, 1987)).
67. Id. at 629.
68. See generally Comision Nacional Sobre La Desaparicion De Personas, Nunca Mas (9th
ed. 1985) (documenting human rights abuses in Argentina).
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tion to it. This is the age-old evil that most human rights
conventions, including the Convention Against Torture, are meant to
address; and radical feminists are wrong, I think, in drawing the
alarmist inference that a hidden purpose or effect of these conventions
is to free states from their other international obligations, including
the obligation to protect the rights of women against invasion by pri-
vate individuals.
On the other hand, the point that state complicity or inaction in the
face of private torture should have been included in the Convention is
unexceptionable. As I indicated above, under the liberal theory of
international law, governments that tolerate the violation of women's
rights by private individuals should not be allowed to hide behind the
claim that such conduct is outside the purview of the international
law of human rights. 69
e. State Obligations to Criminalize Rights Violations
The question then returns to the issue of which acts or omissions
amount to state complicity. The broad radical feminist claim is that
the reluctance of a government to intervene in internal family affairs
amounts to complicity. We saw that if domestic law fails to criminal-
ize or punish the behavior of husbands who torment their wives the
state should be held accountable by international law. 0 There are, of
course, degrees of government negligence, and lines must inevitably
be drawn. Nevertheless, the traditional international law requirement
that states take reasonable steps to prevent and punish crimes seems
to me an entirely appropriate standard.
Although even the most liberal states may have been remiss in the
past in this regard (and there is surely much yet to be done, especially
in the Latin American democracies), most democratic, rights-respect-
ing states have laws that prohibit and punish the abuse of women.
Where that legislation is enforced in good faith, holding such states
nonetheless internationally responsible for the instances of abuse of
women that still occur is like holding states internationally responsi-
69. The same situation occurs when death squads operate in face of a government's inaction
or complicity. See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 1990 86-89 (1990)
(describing death squad activities in El Salvador). Here again, one cannot avoid this problem
by defining "human rights violation" as a behavior that can be carried out only by a state
official. Not only is it impossible to draw normative conclusions from definitions, but, from
the standpoint of political theory, a private citizen may violate an individual's rights as much
as the government. In fact, under social contract theory, it is precisely the danger of rights
invasions by individuals that motivates persons in the state of nature to create the state.
70. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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ble for, say, murders that are committed every year notwithstanding
the states' good faith efforts at crime prevention. It is one thing to
hold a state in breach of international human rights law if it know-
ingly tolerates the behavior of wife-beaters (or death squads, or the
Mafia), or if it fails to enact or enforce appropriate protective legisla-
tion, as in the Dutch case. It is a very different thing to hold a state
responsible when, despite reasonable legislation and law enforcement,
crimes are still committed by private persons.
I would go further: from a human rights standpoint, it is actually
counterproductive to strive for perfect (or even near-perfect) crime
control.7 1 For in such a system, effective deterrence would be
achieved by criminal codes imposing harsh punishments, such as
death, for even minor offenses, and the law would be enforced by an
aggressive and intrusive police force with broad powers of arrest and
seizure. Citizens of a liberal democracy, concerned with limiting
rather than enlarging state power, would rightly reject legislation so
severe and law enforcement machineries so efficient as to ensure the
punishment of all wife beaters, just as they would a system that
ensured the punishment of all murderers. Even granting that the
problem today lies in too little, rather than too much, state interven-
tion against the abuse of women, there is surely a point at which the
costs of more intervention will outweigh the benefits. But where
should the line be drawn? What do radical feminists propose? When
the rhetorical dust settles, it is difficult to tell exactly how radical fem-
inists intend to deter private violence against women while curtailing
the power of the (putatively) oppressive patriarchal state.
f. Conclusion
Both radical and liberal feminists generally agree that the statist
orientation of traditional international legal theory tends to the detri-
ment of women. A truly liberal theory of international law, on the
Kantian model, rejects statism as impermissibly solicitous of rights
violations by states, and unresponsive to the justified claims of all per-
sons, including women, to dignity and equal treatment. The rejection
of statism entails scrutiny not only of the official acts of states, but
also of their complicity and even omissions in the protection of
human rights. The notion that liberalism entails statism is therefore
misconceived; the logic of liberal internationalism requires that inter-
national law limit absolute sovereignty to improve the situation of
71. See Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jules L. Coleman, Philosophy of Law 119 (2d ed. 1990).
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women, insofar as women remain deprived of equal respect and
dignity.
C. The Radical Claim of Inherent Oppressiveness
I will now respond to the third feminist critique of international
law, the claim that international law is inherently oppressive of
women. Some feminists argue that because current international law
derives from European, male, liberal legalism, its very form and struc-
ture are inherently patriarchal and oppressive. In response to this
contention, I first argue that the foundations of the "inherent oppres-
siveness" thesis are faulty, that nothing in the philosophic "nature" of
a state makes it oppressive or non-oppressive, and that the radical
feminists' nominalism only serves to obscure differences between
states that defenders of women's interests ought to care about. I then
examine and defend two institutions of liberal political thought prof-
fered by some radical feminists as constitutive of "inherent" liberal
oppression: the public-private distinction, and the liberal emphasis on
individual autonomy. Against these philosophical attacks, I offer a
positive justification of the Kantian premises, viewing them as norma-
tive commitments rather than deductions from some arcane mascu-
linist metaphysics. In the final subsection, I examine the
methodological strictures entailed by the Kantian normative commit-
ments and criticize radical feminists for abandoning them, and with
them, the liberal norms of objectivity and intellectual integrity.
1. States as "Inherently" Oppressive
A number of radical feminists argue that states are inherently patri-
archal entities-again, bothering little with distinctions between lib-
eral and illiberal governments. Perhaps radical feminists believe that
the governments of liberal democracies are, to paraphrase Marx, mere
committees to handle the interests of men. If an interest of men were
to secure the continuing oppression of women, and if the state were
now and forever a property of men, then the international law princi-
ples of sovereign equality and nonintervention would indeed operate
systematically to the detriment of women. Of course, under these
assumptions no truly legitimate state or government currently exists;
all appear in this light as simply men's devices to perpetuate their
domination of women. Under this view, states are patriarchal enti-
ties; governments (even formally democratic ones) represent the male
6ites of those entities; and international law abets this tyranny by
securing the sovereignty of states. These assertions hold true-
equally true-for all states.
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It is significant, in this regard, that Charlesworth and her associates
do not emphasize violations of women's rights by particular govern-
ments, even though in many countries women are officially discrimi-
nated against, and sometimes even horribly mutilated with official
endorsement or complicity.72 This omission is related, I believe, to
the inherent oppressiveness thesis. Identifying and opposing egre-
gious human rights practices simply holds less philosophic interest for
the radical feminist than unmasking patriarchal oppression as a per-
vasive (albeit often "invisible") evil. Moreover, defending the rights of
the oppressed against their government already presupposes the
acceptance of rights discourse, and runs the risk of treating women as
equal citizens, something radical feminists expressly refuse to do."
Their obsession with male dominance leads radical feminists to the
grotesque proposition that the oppression of women is as serious in
liberal democracies as in those societies that institutionally victimize
and exclude women.7 4 For feminists to try to improve the condition
of women in even the freest societies is a commendable goal, since
liberal democracies are not free of sexist practices. This is very differ-
ent, however, from claiming that liberal democracies and tyrannical
states are morally equivalent in the way they treat women. Such an
assertion not only perverts the facts; it does a disservice to the
women's cause.
75
The sweeping radical thesis that states are inherently oppressive is
not only politically counterproductive, but also philosophically unten-
able. The assertion that a social arrangement is unjust or oppressive
72. See, e.g., Kay Boulware-Miller, Female Circumcision, Challenges to the Practice as a
Human Rights Violation, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 155 (1985).
73. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 631-32 (criticizing the Women's Convention for
assuming that men and women are the same). Charlesworth and her associates do not want to
be treated "equally" if such treatment is judged against a male standard. Id. Charlesworth
and her associates rely extensively on the work of MacKinnon for this point.
74. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 616-21 (arguing that although women's
situations differ in the Third and First Worlds, they are united by the common phenomenon of
male domination).
75. Another reason for this "moral equivalence" thesis stems from a curiosity in the history
of radical thought. Radical feminists are leftists, and one of the mottoes of the left is solidarity
with the Third World. Therefore, radical feminists feel more comfortable in criticizing the
"imperialist" West than in acknowledging that in many Third World societies women are
seriously mistreated. The anti-Western bias of Charlesworth and her associates is clear in their
brief reference to female circumcision. They delicately refer to "the tension between some First
and Third World feminists over the correct approach to the issue of female genital mutilation."
Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 619 n.39. The extraordinary practice of criticizing the
liberal West while offering solicitude for genital mutilation suggests the root of the "tension"
all too well: one cannot at the same time be a feminist and be sentimental about the Third
World.
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is contingent; it depends not only on the theory of justice that is pre-
supposed, but on the facts as well. "Oppression" does not follow
from the definition of "state"; it is not therefore inherent in the social
organization we know as the modem state. Oppression may be
defined as occurring when an individual or a group unjustly prevents
others from exercising choices, and this may or may not occur in a
particular case. Viewing oppressiveness as a necessary rather than
contingent property of states is undoubtedly an epistemological con-
venience for the radical; there is no need to bother with scrutinizing
the political practices of actual states. Unfortunately, the product of
this sort of inquiry can be nothing more than nominalism: metaphys-
ics in, metaphysics out.
The problem with the claim that states are inherently patriarchal
entities is that it is not subject to empirical disconfirmation. It is true
that some radical proponents of the patriarchy thesis believe in the
(perhaps utopian) possibility of a non-patriarchal world. 6 Short of
utopia, however, the patriarchy thesis holds the oppressiveness of
states beyond the need of empirical validation. To be sure, not all
propositions have to be testable to retain philosophical credibility.
Metaphysical statements, definitions, or moral assertions, for exam-
ple, may be validly non-testable.77 But the claim that states are inher-
ently oppressive structures is neither an analytic truth, a pure deontic
ought-statement, nor a transparently metaphysical claim with no
apparent referent in the world of facts. Rather, the claim purports to
be descriptive of actual social relations, and as such, it must be subject
to interpersonal methods of empirical validation.78 As we have seen,
the radical's metaphysics attempts precisely to avoid such validation:
the thesis admits no contrary proof.
The inherent oppressiveness thesis is connected with a radical
notion of social determinism; that notion, too, admits of no degree or
gradation, and lies beyond dispute. For at least some radical feminists
there may be a possiblefuture world in which women will be emanci-
76. See Toward a Feminist Theory, supra note 11, at 249 (envisioning a theory or the state
based on "a new relation between life and law").
77. Metaphysical statements, rougfily speaking, are those without any referent in the
physical world; for example, statements about a transcendent God may be metaphysical.
Analytic truths are circular statements in which the predicate can be logically derived from an
analysis of the subject; hence, the statement "all bachelors are male" can be derived from the
definition of "bachelor" (an unmarried adult male), and no empirical confirmation is
necessary. Finally, "ought" statements, commands, questions, and other utterances that do
not assert a state of the world may not require verification.
78. For a classic rejection of metaphysics in legal and social thought, see Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L Rev. 809 (1935).
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pated, but there is presently no society, no marriage, no relationship,
in which women are free in any meaningful sense. Even in the freest
societies (the Western liberal democracies) where most choices by
women are apparently autonomous in the liberal sense, radical femi-
nists insist either that such choices are not really autonomous because
women have been socialized to make them, or that there is no such
thing as autonomy anyway.7 9 Indeed, even consensual sexual inter-
course is regarded by some of them as oppressive.80 Accordingly,
every social fact is interpreted in the light of this premise, which is
itself immune to challenge. Like Marxists before them, radical femi-
nists see their theory of gender oppression and hierarchy confirmed in
every single social event, for the good reason that no single fact counts
as a counterexample.8 ' No improvement in women's condition
counts as a move toward liberation; states remain patriarchal entities,
and women remain oppressed, regardless of progressive legislation or
significant advances for women. No amount of mere reform will pla-
cate the radical feminist.
So the sweeping definition of the state as inherently oppressive of
women is, in my view, factually false because there are or could be
states where women are not oppressed, 2 and morally irresponsible
because it trivializes tyranny. States come in many moral shapes. In
some states women are oppressed; in some others blacks are
oppressed; whites are persecuted in a few; in yet other states members
of a particular religion, speakers of a certain language, or foreigners
may be mistreated; and in some states almost everyone is oppressed.
The radical feminist's insistence on the inherent oppression of women
by the state succeeds only in blurring the distinction between freedom
and tyranny; for the purposes of the "inherent oppressiveness" thesis,
a state where the government murders and tortures women is in the
same moral category as one where there is a statistical gender imbal-
ance in the public employees roster.
A final problem with the theory of inherent patriarchal oppressive-
ness is that, even in skilled hands, it tends to stray dangerously close
to a deservingly discredited form of social thought: conspiracy the-
79. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man"
Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1171
(1992).
80. See Desire and Power, supra note 11, at 60; see also Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse
(1987).
81. See, e.g., Difference and Dominance, supra note 12, at 40, 42.
82. If a non-oppressive state is even imaginable, then "oppression" cannot follow from the
definition of "state"; for a non-oppressive state would be a contradiction in terms, like a square
circle.
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ory.13  A feminist conspiratorial theory of the state attempts to
explain social phenomena by suggesting that men, interested in pre-
serving patriarchy, have in some manner devised and implemented a
plan to perpetuate the subjugation of women. 4 Of course, one cannot
deny that there is something exhilarating in postulating a total expla-
nation of society, or the universe: every occurrence can be effortlessly
explained by reference to the One Great Conspiratorial Premise,85
and we are relieved of trying to discover and understand complex
causal chains of social events. But an explanation of the complexities
of human history by reference to a pervasive, sinister, trans-genera-
83. In a passage as much reminiscent of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau as it is of the Book ot
Genesis, MacKinnon announces a quasi-conspiratorial radical feminist creation story:
Here, on the first day that matters, dominance was achieved, probably by force. By
the second day, division along the same lines had to be relatively firmly in place. On
the third day, if not sooner, differences were demarcated, together with social
systems to exaggerate them in perception and in fact, because the systematically
differential delivery of benefits and deprivations required making no mistake about
who was who. Comparatively speaking, man has been resting ever since.
Difference and Dominance, supra note 12, at 40 (emphasis in original). The idea that (even
physical) sex differences precede gender differentiation is called into question. MacKinnon
presents our perceptions of differences between the sexes as merely ideological constructs
designed to legitimate oppression: "if gender is an inequality first, constructed as a socially
relevant differentiation in order to keep that inequality in place, then sex inequality questions
are questions of systematic dominance, of male supremacy, which is not at all abstract and is
anything but a mistake." Id. at 42.
Of course, not all feminists endorse (or even flirt with) a conspiratorial explanation of the
state. I follow here, mutads mutandis, Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies 94-
95 (2d ed. 1966). Popper views conspiracy theories as secular echoes of the superstitious belief
that Homeric gods determine the outcome of battles.
84. Thus, MacKinnon writes,
Speaking descriptively rather than functionally or motivationally, the strategy is first
to constitute society unequally prior to law; then to design the constitution, including
the law of equality, so that all its guarantees apply only to those values that are taken
away by law; then to construct legitimating norms so that the state legitimates itself
through noninterference with the status quo. Then, so long as male dominance is so
effective in society that it is unnecessary to impose sex inequality through law, such
that only the most superficial sex inequalities become de jure, not even a legal
guarantee of sex equality will produce social equality.
Toward a Feminist Theory, supra note 11, at 163-64. Speaking descriptively, MacKinnon's
strategy seems to be to hide the careful qualifiers in the sweep of language (note the introduc-
tory phrase), and reap the rhetorical benefits of the conspiratorial assertion not quite made.
85. In radical feminist theory, men play the role that the capitalists, the Learned Men of
Zion, the imperialists, the communists, etc., have played in various other conspiracy theories.
Conspiracy theories, however, do become important when people who hold them are in power,
for in that case they will spend most of their energies in a counter-conspiracy against non-
existent conspirators. Popper, supra note 83, at 95. For an almost pristine example of a
conspiracy theory, the military Junta in Argentina (1976-1984) believed that the world's
outrage over their human rights violations was the result of a "well-orchestrated anti-
Argentine campaign" waged by communists led by Amnesty International.
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tional, yet invisible cabal surely need not, and ought not, be taken
seriously.
There are two fast and effective ways to undermine a conspiracy
theory. One is simply to deny that such a conspiracy ever took place,
shifting the (rather weighty) burden of persuasion to the conspiracy
theorist. The second is to observe that, even if a conspiracy actually
took place, conspirators on the social stage very rarely consummate
their designs-let alone effect their ends over the course of centuries.
As Sir Karl Popper has perceptively shown, this is often the case with
social action, conspiracy or no conspiracy, because of the effetspervers
(the unintended consequences) of social action.8 6 Even if men in fact
conspired to achieve the present world, they could not possibly have
anticipated every consequence of their machinations.
A conspiratorial explanation of the modem state is not only impov-
erished and simplistic;87 it also overlooks both the magnitude and the
direction of the social forces unleashed when the universality of
human rights was proclaimed by the "bourgeoisie. '8 8 Feminists, radi-
cal and liberal, are correct that many of the architects (and stewards)
of liberalism have intended the exclusion of women from many of the
benefits of liberty. This, however, was the precipitate of a mistaken
anthropology, not a mistaken ethics.89 Once the prejudice against
women was exposed as such, the universality of liberal moral theory,
logically entailed by the belief in the inherent dignity of all persons,
acquired, as it were, a life of its own, and resulted in an astonishing
improvement of the predicament of women in free societies. Given
the egalitarian consequences of the Enlightenment and the liberal rev-
olutions that it inspired, one is hard pressed to describe the modem
liberal state and the international alliance of liberal states as inher-
ently oppressive of women. More plausibly, they have been the
matrix of women's liberation.
2. The Public-Private Distinction Revisited
Radical feminists have sought support for the idea that liberal insti-
tutions are inherently oppressive in the fact that much of liberal the-
86. See id.
87. See Neil MacKormick, Law, State, and Feminism: MacKinnon's Theses Considered, 10
L. & Phil. 447, 450 (1991) (arguing that MacKinnon's conspiracy theory gets out of hand).
88. The use of the term "bourgeoisie" by Marxists and their progeny to refer to liberals is
already derisive. It portrays those who have struggled and died to secure the liberties we enjoy
as merely greedy merchants intent on peddling their wares.
89. See Barbara Herman, Integrity and Impartiality, 66 Monist 233, 234-40 (1983); see also
infra note 120.
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ory and law has relied on a distinction between public and private
spheres of society. Feminists have contended that the public-private
distinction is something of a fake, an ideological construct designed to
devalue women and their work by confining them to the (less prestigi-
ous) private domain. 90 Insofar as feminists seek access for women to
markets, politics, and other areas of the public sphere, their efforts
fully accord with the imperatives of Kantian liberalism. But when
radical feminists reject a person's free choice of a life in the public or
private sphere, from a liberal perspective they merely seek to impose
their own preferences upon others, and should be resisted in the inter-
est of the Kantian ideal of equal dignity, which mandates respect for
the considered choices of other rational persons.
Feminists rightly criticize the coercive confinement of women to the
(presumably less valued) private sphere.9 From making this valid
observation, however, to rejecting wholesale the distinction between
public and private law there is an expansive logical gap, and the latter
assertion seems to me misguided. Radical feminists, having discov-
ered that the identification of women with the private domain is
unjust, conclude that we should give up altogether the distinction
between private and public law.92
A first reply is that the concept of family privacy makes some sense
(notwithstanding the justified feminist critique already discussed93)
insofar as it remains derivative of individual rights and autonomy, in
the same way that state sovereignty is derivative of individual rights
and autonomy. Liberals, unlike communitarians, ground family pri-
vacy in individual autonomy and freedom, not in the primacy of the
group over the individual. The duty of the state not to interfere with
the family (provided the rights of their members are protected) is thus
a simple extension of the duty to respect voluntary arrangements
entered into by individuals. Even a radical feminist, I assume, would
agree that if the state sent agents to take children away for re-educa-
tion, or to make sure that sexual intercourse was practiced in the offi-
cially sanctioned manner, it would violate a private familial space.9'
A consequence of accepting an autonomy-based family privacy is that
90. Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 625-27; see also Privacy v. Equality, supra note 50,
at 99-102; Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Private/Public Dichotomy in Public and
Private Social Life 281 (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983).
91. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 625-30.
92. See, e.g., Toward a Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 11, at 193-94.
93. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
94. Indeed, this is the position taken by many feminists on abortion and other matters of
reproductive autonomy.
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the distinction between private and public may well reflect in many
cases a rational division of labor between the sexes achieved through
non-coercive, voluntary arrangements (radical feminists
notwithstanding.)
More generally, individual freedom requires separation between the
private and public spheres, because the distinction is simply the legal
consequence of the moral imperative of individual privacy required by
any but the most totalitarian theories of law. For liberals, the power
of the state is always limited, and individuals should be legally
allowed to make choices in their personal and economic lives free of
governmental coercion. This elementary idea (and not some conspir-
acy to oppress women), lies at the basis of the much maligned public-
private distinction. Far from being "an ideological construct rational-
izing the exclusion of women from the sources of power,"9 the pub-
lic-private distinction is a centerpiece of any constitutional system
that protects human rights. 96 The problem is not the public-private
distinction, but the confinement of women to the private sphere.
In the light of this obvious and, in my view, conclusive reply, why
must radical feminism insist upon such an extreme account of the
public-private distinction? The answer, again, lies in the ideology.
The private, autonomous sphere that radicals challenge is but a trav-
esty of liberalism's insistence on individual self-determination free
from governmental coercion. Radical feminists align liberal auton-
omy with a conception of the family as a Dantesque place where the
physically stronger husband victimizes weaker family members. Call-
ing wife abuse an instance of "family autonomy" is as offensive as
calling Saddam Hussein's genocide of the Kurds an instance of Iraqi
"self-determination." 97 Family autonomy is the least liberal part of
the "liberal" theory that radical feminists believe they are challenging.
Just as the human rights-based theory of international law is unsym-
pathetic to absolute international nonintervention in the domestic
affairs of the state, so it is unsympathetic to absolute government non-
intervention in family affairs (or church affairs, or school affairs)
when the individual rights of members of the community in question
are threatened. Genuine liberal theory refuses to tolerate a private
domain in which the strong can victimize the weak with impunity.
95. Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 629.
96. What should we put in the place of a law that distinguishes between private and public
spheres? Should all law be public law? One shudders at the prospect of such a world.
97. See Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 2, at 26-31 (discussing such spurious use of
self-determination).
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3. Individual Autonomy and the Normative Bases of Kantianism
Another fertile source of speculation about the idea of inherent
oppressiveness is the liberal emphasis on individual autonomy. A
number of radical feminists have attacked the notion;98 some believe
that women do not relate to autonomy but instead to "connected-
ness," and that abstractions about sovereignty, states, governments,
and even human rights therefore ignore women's experiences and
exclude their perspectives.99 This position is common to feminists
and communitarians, but where feminists use it to recommend an eth-
ics of care instead of, or alongside, an ethics of justice, communitari-
ans use it instead to exalt communities-including those that, from a
liberal or feminist standpoint, oppress people.1°
What is distinctively feminist about this radical critique is the view
that the law's reliance on concepts such as autonomy, rights, and jus-
tice is a fundamentally masculine trait. As one commentator
describes the radical feminist position, "[l]iberalism has been viewed
as inextricably masculine in its model of separate, atomistic, compet-
ing individuals establishing a legal system to pursue their own inter-
ests and to protect them from others' interference with their rights to
do so.' ' 1O The argument, analogous here to the communitarian cri-
tique, is that this masculine jurisprudence has unduly emphasized
rights over responsibilities, autonomy over "connectedness," and the
individual over the community. The radical implication seems to be
that the basis of liberalism is unsound, that its foundation rests upon
an unsupported masculinist metaphysics.
a. Individual Autonomy and Kantianism
It is true that the idea of the self as rational and autonomous is
central to the Kantian theory of international law. The Kantian the-
ory regards individuals as capable of independent, rational choice. It
also regards them as possessed of inherent dignity and worthy of
respect.10 2 These propositions together form the cornerstone of the
98. See, e.g., Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 617 (citing Sandra G. Harding. The
Science Question in Feminism 165-71 (1986)). For a discussion on the point of "separateness"
versus "connectedness," see generally Minow, supra note 13. For an excellent reply, compare
McClain, supra note 79, at 1171 (arguing that the feminist view supporting "connectedness"
inaccurately portrays contemporary liberalism).
99. West, supra note 11; Minow, supra note 13.
100. See Marylin Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the
Community, 99 Ethics 275, 277-81 (1989).
101. McClain, supra note 79, at 1173.
102. See The Kantian Theory, supra note 2, at 62-66.
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theory. The Kantian theory therefore happily concedes the charge by
radical feminists and communitarians that it exalts the individual over
the community-this is indeed the central tenet of liberalism. 0 3
These Kantian premises also form the basis of international human
rights law; indeed, it would be difficult to make sense of that body of
law if they were discarded. 1°4 In the international arena, legitimate
states are the ones that recognize and honor individual autonomy,
and a just international legal system is likewise one that embodies a
basic respect for human rights, that is, an imperative to treat people
with dignity and respect.
b. Autonomy as a "Masculine" Concept
I will first respond to the claim that the autonomous self is a dis-
tinctively masculine concept and should therefore be rejected as
biased. Two things may be meant by this assertion: that the theory of
autonomy was created by men, or that it is a reflection of how men
typically think or feel, and thus excludes women.' 0 5
Neither version of the claim defeats the liberal commitment to indi-
vidual autonomy; both confuse the context of origin with the context
ofjustification of a theory. It is perfectly possible to concede that the
concept of autonomy is masculine in origin or mental make-up, but
that it is also the correct position to hold. Who created the theory or
how it came about or whether men or women think more about it may
103. It is a gross caricature to portray liberalism as encouraging an ethics of selfishness and
lack of concern for others. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
104. For example, the U.N. Charter has a remarkably Kantian emphasis on the "dignity
and worth of the human person." U.N. Charter Preamble.
105. See generally Minow, supra note 13. For the view that women think differently about
morality, see generally Gilligan, supra note 3.
Some feminists argue that women, because of their nurturing nature, are more pacific than
men, and that international law would therefore be more effective in curbing war if women had
a greater role in its creation and implementation. See Charlesworth et al., supra note I, at 628.
For a survey of the literature, see Micaela Di Leonardo, Morals, Mothers, and Militarism:
Antimilitarism and Feminist Theory, 11 Feminist Stud. 599 (1985); cf. Barbara Stark,
Nurturing Rights: An Essay on Women, Peace, and International Human Rights, 13 Mich. J.
Int'l L. 144 (1991) (correlating international recognition of basic economic, social, and cultural
rights with women's increased participation in public life and with the promotion of peace).
Professor Stark's suggestion, however, is distinct from the "women are more peaceful" thesis
because, for her, peace is promoted by the recognition of certain "nurturing rights." Id. at
147. Her views are thus closer to liberal feminism.
The view that women are more peaceful is arguable. Women can be as ruthless and
belligerent as men. The curious reader may consult Jessica A. Salmonson, Encyclopedia of
Amazon: Women Warriors from Antiquity to the Modern Era (1991). Indeed, feminine war
prowess is assumed by some feminists when arguing for allowing women to participate in
combat.
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be interesting historical or anthropological questions, but they are
irrelevant to whether or not the theory is justified. Dismissing liber-
alism as distinctively masculine because it was formulated by men or
because it is a masculine way of thinking is like dismissing the theory
of relativity as distinctively Jewish because it was formulated by
Albert Einstein. Indeed, if I were persuaded by radical feminists that
the feminine way of thinking about political philosophy is illiberal, I
would do my best to keep women from power. But of course, the
claim that women think about morality in less liberal ways is as false
as the claim that men think about morality in more liberal ways."'
Liberals, it seems, give women more credit than do their radical
defenders.
Radical feminists, like communitarians and other radicals, believe
that the liberal assumption of autonomy is mistaken because the self is
not autonomous but rather socially constituted.10 7 This point (which
for some reason has become almost undisputed among radicals and
even among many of their detractors) is overdrawn. Among other
things, it overlooks the undeniable capacity of human beings to over-
come the constraints of history, tradition, and social pressures,
including state coercion, to challenge existing values and follow their
own lights. 10 In addition, the claim is self-refuting, because if choices
are socially constituted, presumably the choices of illiberal dissenters
who challenge liberalism (the latter being the predominant philosophy
in the West) are not excepted from this deterministic postulate. Radi-
cal feminists cannot just say that liberal society conditions every-
body's choices except the radicals' own choices. One cannot hold a
theory whose very formulation contradicts its central premise. The
radicals' theorizing would not be possible if values and choices were
entirely socially constituted: only people in Teheran, not in Berkeley,
would be able to challenge liberalism. 109
106. Again, I am aware that perhaps there is no way of proving this, because every example
of a "liberal" woman, the majority of women in the West, is dismissed by the radical feminist.
For some radical feminists, neither liberal nor conservative women "speak" for women. Se
e.g., Difference and Dominance, supra note 12.
107. There are sharp differences among radical feminists about the import of this claim.
MacKinnon believes that this condition is unacceptable because women's apparently free
choices are not really free but coerced. Feminism Unmodified, supra note 11. West, however,
contends that the biological fact of material connectedness (a form of biological determinism)
grounds the feminine way of thinking about ethics. West, supra note 11.
108. See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 113 (1985).
109. The current revolt against liberal values in the academic West shows that people can
challenge tradition and cherished societal values-vindicating, ironically, the liberal view. The
point is that people are capable of making choices that are not socially determined.
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c. Kantian Liberalism as a Normative Theory of Autonomy
Kantian liberalism is a normative, not a metaphysical, proposition.
Even if, gratia argumentandi, the claim that choices are socially deter-
mined is conceded, the concession need not affect the moral force of
liberalism. The normative injunction to respect autonomy amounts to
this: people make choices, they care about them, and we must respect
them (within the framework of the coercion presupposed by the social
contract), even if those choices are, in a Laplacean sense, biologically
or socially determined. Liberals claim that, regardless of the response
to the ultimate metaphysical question of social or biological determin-
ism, a distinctive characteristic of human beings is their capacity for
what for all purposes look like rational choices, and that such a capac-
ity must be respected by fellow citizens and by the government. This
is a moral, not a metaphysical claim." 0
Another way of making the same point is this: we don't know the
right answer to the old philosophical controversy about the extent to
which our choices are socially or biologically determined. Morality,
however, requires us to act as if people were rational and autono-
mous. Freedom of the will is thus postulated as a logically necessary
pre-requisite of the best principles of individual and political moral-
ity. " Therefore, in attempting to answer the metaphysical question,
we risk error on the side of liberty, as it were: if we treated persons as
if they were social or biological robots (and we do not have a positive
proof that they are robots) the set of moral and political principles
constructed on such an assumption would be truly terrifying." 2 We
must treat people as if they possessed free will because that is the right
thing to do, and this requires the rejection of radical determinism. On
a Kantian analysis, our belief in treating persons with dignity and
respect should determine our answer to the controverted metaphysi-
cal question, and not the other way round. Liberal theory thus rejects
radical determinism for moral reasons.
Radical feminists, by contrast, ignore, disparage, or assume away
the actual choices of women when it is convenient for them to do so;
110. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 441 n.19 (1986) (arguing that liberals are tolerant
because it is the right thing to do, not because of a belief in psychological "separateness"); see
also McClain, supra note 79.
11I. See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 115-16 (H.J. Paton
trans., 3d ed. 1965). 1 am indebted to Jeff Murphy for calling my attention to this point.
112. Radical feminists could reply that the principles built on the assumption of freedom
have themselves been terrifying for women in practice. The only recourse is to the facts, and
the facts suggest that terror travels with illiberalism. See Amnesty International, supra note
37.
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for example, the choice of some women to stay in the home.' 1 3
Because radical feminists believe homemakers' choices to be degrad-
ing, they conclude that those are not real choices, but are rather
forced by socialization.114 Leaving aside the disdain for family, moth-
erhood, and heterosexuality associated with this claim, 1t5 the form of
argument itself is highly suspect. One cannot just pick those choices
that one approves of ideologically as being "real" choices, and dis-
count those that do not fit our preferred utopia as merely "apparent."
From a Kantian standpoint, there is an imperative to respect people's
rational, autonomous choices. If the individual's autonomy has been
impaired by coercion or fraud, then of course it will not be a real
choice in the Kantian sense. Absent coercion or fraud, however, the
choice of a homemaker to devote herself to the family ought to be
valued and honored.' 16
A liberal feminist, however, might reply as follows: the Kantian
theory insists that choices be rational, and the Kantian idea of ration-
ality is indeed complex.' 1 7 It would certainly be a mistake to portray
Kant's categorical imperative as a command to respect any prefer-
ence: irrational choices are not deserving of respect. Hence, the lib-
eral feminist may conclude, the choices of the homemakers are
irrational, comparable perhaps to the choices of people who know-
ingly surrender their rights to a tyrant. Such a view, however,
depends on the a priori decision that the family is a less valued and
important domain-a most controversial premise, especially for
feminists.
There is a good case to be made for the proposition that choosing to
stay in the home is a rational choice for many women.'" What
should be rejected is the superstitious prejudice that the woman's role,
predetermined by God or by Nature, must be the home. There is
113. On this, see the excellent discussion in Meyers, supra note 7.
114. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not by Law Alone: From a Debate with Phyllis
Schlafly, in Feminism Unmodified, supra note 11, at 21-31.
115. See id.
116. See Meyers, supra note 7, at 621-24.
117. See Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory 23-30 (1989).
118. It would be pointless to cite support for this proposition because its truth depends
upon a definition of free will which radical feminists will not accept, regardless of how many
instances one provides of actual homemakers who are happy with their choices and are
fulfilled by their life plans. Nevertheless, uncoerced choices by homemakers ought to be
valued. Failure to do so strips countless homemakers of their dignity and fails to account for
"the sensitivity and imagination that childcare requires." Meyers, supra note 8. at 621.
Suggesting that working in the home may be a rational choice for many women is totally
different from suggesting that women are biologically inclined to make such choices. Kantian
liberalism regards the latter idea as either false or irrelevant.
19931
678 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
nothing in the liberal account of morality or human nature that a
priori excludes or mandates home, factory, or Parliament as the place
where a woman finds her self-realization.
d. Autonomy and Compassion
While some radical feminists accuse liberalism of promoting
socially determined choices in the guise of autonomy, others claim
that the liberal emphasis on respect and autonomy does not leave
room for an ethics of care and compassion.1 19 This is an unjustified
charge against liberalism. As many commentators have shown,
rights-based liberalism is perfectly consistent with the flourishing of
human emotions such as love and compassion. 120 The very idea of
inherent dignity and respect for persons requires us to put ourselves in
the place of other people, thus understanding their claims as equal
moral beings.' 21 In this way, the empathetic consideration of other
"selves" and the understanding of the circumstances of others are
intrinsic to moral and political reasoning. 22  Difference is not dis-
carded, but rather factored into our normative judgments.
What Kant was justly concerned about was the fact that people
often do terrible harm to others out of love. He claimed, conse-
quently, that duty is a surer guide to moral behavior. 23 For Kant,
inclination and emotion are just biological natural facts, and as such
contingent and unreliable.'24 Duty, on the contrary, can be dispas-
119. For a thoughtful article on this issue, see Sally Sedgwick, Can Kant's Ethics Survive
the Feminist Critique?, 71 Pac. Phil. Q. 60 (1990).
120. For an excellent defense of Kant against radical objections, see Herman, supra note 89,
at 234-40; see also McClain, supra note 79. Professor Sedgwick concludes that although it is
true that radical feminists have mischaracterized Kant, Kant's categorical imperative
universalizes the male identity, causing feminist doubts to remain. Sedgwick, supra note 119.
This claim assumes too narrow an interpretation of the categorical imperative, however. The
categorical imperative is above all an injunction to treat others with dignity and respect, not a
simple logical requirement of universalizability of moral judgments. See John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice 251 n.29, 257 (1971) (contending one should avoid interpreting Kant's
writings as merely providing formal requirements for moral judgments); see also Jeffrie G.
Murphy, Kant: The Philosophy of Right 65-86 (1970) (stating that Kant's morality is not only
formal, but also includes ends, purposes, and values); cf. The Kantian Theory, supra note 2, at
60-74 (concluding that Kantian political theory should provide for positive socioeconomic
rights).
121. See Okin, supra note 8, at 29-32.
122. Modem liberals expressly disavow an interpretation of liberalism that would exclude
care and concern for others. See, e.g., John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,
77 J. Phil. 515 (1980); see also Dworkin, supra note 110, at 441-44 n.20 (finding sympathy for
tort victims is consistent with liberalism).
123. See Kant, supra note 111, at 61-67.
124. Id. at 63-64.
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sionately (though not infallibly) ascertained by the exercise of reason,
and is as such accessible to every human being regardless of his incli-
nations. This position does not exclude love and compassion; it just
refuses to make them the foundation of morality. The Kantian cau-
tionary message is quite plausible: until that time when universal love
(mandatory love?) is achieved, civil society will rest on firmer ground
in mandating simply respect.
Liberalism does not espouse any particular theory of psychological
personality. 25 People make choices (even if they are, in some general
sense, determined), and care about them. The categorical imperative
directs us, and governments, to respect those choices, at least when
they are rational (where "rational" means both universalizable and
respectful of the dignity of others).1 26 The arguments against liber-
alism, therefore, need to focus on this normative thesis; that is, they
must show why individual autonomy ought not be respected, at least
under specified circumstances. Certainly radical feminist critics of
international law would have to support at least a significant disman-
tling of international human rights law, because, as I already indi-
cated, that body of law relies expressly on the principles of liberal
autonomy and the equal dignity of all persons, men and women. My
suspicion (although this may be unduly optimistic) is that these critics
do not want to take us all the way in this direction.
4. Science, Method, and Objectivity
The radical abandonment of the normative premises of liberalism
must inevitably raise questions of method, because the intellectual val-
ues that guide research and debate in the Western world arose, and
exist, within liberalism. For the liberal, questions of intellectual ethics
are vital, and the commitment to intellectual integrity is fundamental.
These values have been challenged by radical feminism: for example,
some feminists reject the "objective standpoint" as nothing more than
a masculine posture, and the scientific method as merely a set of
"male" verification criteria.1 2 This sort of methodological rejection-
125. See, eg., Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 203 (1985).
126. These are the two first versions of Kant's categorical imperative. See Sullivan, supra
note 117, at 149-211.
127. See, eg., Desire and Power, supra note 11, at 54 (rejecting the scientific method as a
"specifically male approach to knowledge"). Charlesworth and her associates seem to accept
this idea. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 613 (emphasizing "the permanent partiality
of feminist inquiry" (quoting Harding, supra note 98, at 194)); see also id. at 617 (challenging
male "epistemology" and calling for a more emotive approach to science (citing Harding.
supra note 98, at 165)).
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ism deserves our most determined opposition. It represents an
obscurantist, pre-Galilean repudiation of even the most elementary
ground rules for testing the validity of empirical claims. It is a troub-
ling commentary on the radical feminists' dogmatic irrationalism, and
should have no place in any serious debate about these issues.
Rejecting the scientific method wholesale is not simply bad episte-
mology, however; it has political consequences. In the radical's
world, because there is nothing even approaching objective truth,
rational argument becomes simply another means to achieve one's
objectives. In its most extreme form, anti-liberal radicalism views
people (and governments) as relieved from constraining rational argu-
ment, and therefore free even to suppress knowledge in the pursuit of
"higher" ends.1 28 The world is just an arena for struggle; there is no
independent value in truth or objectivity. Even in its lesser forms, the
radicals' self-consciously partisan method allows them to cite data
supporting their position (thus showing deference to empirical valida-
tion), but ignore contrary data. 129 The sole objective of radical femi-
nism is the emancipation of women; truth is a value insofar as it
contributes to that effort.1 30
In contrast, liberals regard free intellect as the engine of human
progress, and intellectual integrity as an unconditional ethical com-
mitment-rather than a political value to be weighed against others.
Honesty for the Kantian is part of the categorical imperative to
respect other rational beings by not using them manipulatively as
means to other ends. The liberal commitment to rational discourse
encompasses both science and morality. 131 If we abandon it, as radi-
cals urge, we jeopardize not only the path to knowledge and scientific
progress, but also our most precious freedoms.
The moral predicament ensuing from such radical relativism is also
illustrated by the radical feminist attitude toward rights discourse.
Even while endorsing a thoroughgoing attack against rights, some
radical feminists nevertheless recommend that international human
128. During the military dictatorship in Argentina, the Junta prohibited the teaching in
schools of the set theory of numbers on the ground that it was "collectivist."
129. See, e.g., Neil Gilbert, The Phantom Date Rape Epidemic: How Radical Feminists
Manipulated Data to Exaggerate the Problem, L.A. Daily J., July 17, 1991, at 6.
130. Thus, even though Professor MacKinnon's "critique of the objective standpoint as
male" disavows the scientific method and the "male criteria of verification" it embodies, Desire
and Power, supra note 11, at 54, MacKinnon is rather fond of citing statistics and empirical
research to support her arguments. See, e.g., id. at 1, 41.
131. The Argentine philosopher Carlos Nino has recently provided a cogent defense of
human rights based on moral discourse. See Carlos S. Nino, The Ethics of Human Rights
(1992).
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rights discourse be preserved because it is an "accepted" means of
challenging existing law.13 2 They may mean two different things by
this assertion. They may hold the hypocritical view that they do not
really believe in human rights but that rights discourse is a strategi-
cally expedient means to persuade power-holders to relinquish their
power. Not the least of this view's difficulties is that the feminist will
not be terribly effective in persuading the power-holder to relinquish
his power if he knows that she is insincere in her appeal to rights. The
radical cannot convince the power-holder at the same time of the
truth of the radical theory and of the existence of the injustice, so she
has to fake a belief in justice and rights, knowing that a liberal power-
holder is committed to recognizing the rights of the intolerant as long
as they are kept from actually destroying liberal society. 33 At the
very least, this advocacy of rights for purely strategic purposes calls
into question the integrity of the theory upon which such advocacy is
predicated.
The far preferable view is the one defended by liberal feminists:
rights discourse is "accepted," not for strategic reasons, but for the
moral reasons supplied by the Kantian theory of international law.
Individuals should be respected and allowed to flourish autono-
mously. The liberal theory of international law rejects male privilege
and insists that women be treated with equal dignity, much in the way
promised by the United Nations Charter. 34 Legitimate states are
those that honor that categorical moral imperative as an essential con-
stitutional principle, and individual moral action consists in treating
other rational persons as worthy of respect in every realm of human
endeavor-including the practices of public research and debate.
5. Conclusion
The theory of inherent patriarchal oppression is both philosoph-
ically untenable and politically counterproductive. By positing a cate-
gory into which all states equally fall, radical feminists diminish (or,
indeed, erase) the differences between relatively oppressive and rela-
132. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 634-38.
133. See Rawls, supra note 120, at 216-21.
134. Charlesworth and her associates, apparently ignoring their earlier disparagement of
this liberal assumption as male biased, end their article with the following Kantian sentence:
"To redefine the traditional scope of international law so as to acknowledge the interests of
women can open the way to reimagining possibilities for change and may permit international
law's promise of peaceful coexistence and respect for the dignity of all persons to become a
reality." Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 645 (citing the U.N. Charter pmbl.) (emphasis
added).
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tively humane states. By proceeding on metaphysical grounds, they
insulate their theory from empirical inquiry and criticism. Kantian
liberalism, by contrast, is not a hermetically sealed conceptual system,
but rather a set of normative commitments based on individual auton-
omy and respect for freely chosen social arrangements. Nothing in
liberalism militates against human solidarity in voluntary social
arrangements, nor compels solicitude for abusers of human rights.
Liberalism strives toward an ideal of universal human flourishing, and
does so by methods respectful of individual autonomy, human dig-
nity, and the right to equal treatment.
IV. CONCLUSION: DEFENDING THE LIBERAL VISION
Legal theory has been much enriched by feminist jurisprudence.
Feminists have succeeded in drawing attention to areas where uncriti-
cally received legal theories and doctrines have resulted in injustices
to women. International law should be no exception, and the contri-
bution of Charlesworth and her associates will rightly force interna-
tional lawyers to re-examine features of the international legal system
that embody, actually or potentially, unjust treatment of women.
Much of the radical critique is commendably compatible with a
committed liberal feminism. For example, radical feminists are cor-
rect to urge international organizations to try to achieve gender bal-
ance in their internal appointments. Radical feminists are also right
in challenging statism and a notion of "family autonomy" that coun-
tenances state complicity or inaction in the face of mistreatment of
women by private individuals. Privacy and state sovereignty must be
wedded to democratic legitimacy and respect for individual human
rights, including the rights of women. All of these goals are easily
justified under the Kantian theory of international law.
Yet the basic assumptions of the radical feminist critique are unten-
able and must be rejected with the same energy and conviction that
we reserve for the rejection of other illiberal theories and practices.
Radical feminism exists at a remove from international reality
because it exempts itself, by philosophical fiat, from critical examina-
tion and empirical verification. It wrongly assumes that oppression
belongs to a category of thought accessible to pure philosophic specu-
lation, and thus renders scrutiny of real human rights practices super-
fluous. Perhaps most ominously, radicalism "unprivileges" the
imperatives of objectivity, placing the demands of intellectual integ-
rity and responsible political dialogue on a normative par with other,
more political agendas.
When we move from the philosophical domain to global political
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realities, there is even more reason to resist the radical feminist
agenda. Radical feminists have joined other radicals in attacking lib-
eralism; indeed, their whole case rests upon the supposed bankruptcy
of liberal society, on the moral inadequacy of the kind of civil society
mandated by the Kantian theory of international law. But is the
oppression of women correlated to liberal practices? The answer is,
emphatically, "no." The feminist claim that male domination is an
inherent part of liberal discourse 35 and that liberal institutions are
therefore inevitably oppressive of women is both politically counter-
productive and patently false.
The truth is that the situation of women is immeasurably better in
liberal societies, Western or non-Western. The most sexist societies,
in contrast, are those informed and controlled by illiberal theories and
institutions. 36 These societies are much more exclusive of women
than liberal societies (and most of the Western societies are liberal).
Thus, naive assertions such as that "decisionmaking processes in
[non-Western] societies are every bit as exclusive of women as in
Western societies"1 37 merely reflect the warped starting premise that
free societies and tyrannical ones138 are, in some "deep" reality, mor-
ally equivalent. As we have seen, this sort of "depth" only obscures.
The failure to reckon with the facts on record by those claiming to be
concerned with the plight of women amounts to serious moral
irresponsibility.
The situation of women in liberal societies plainly reveals that liber-
alism has not yet fulfilled its promise to women of equal dignity. Lib-
eralism is an ideal only partially realized, and its progress can at times
seem painfully slow. Yet notwithstanding its imperfections, liber-
alism remains the most humane and progressively transformative sys-
tem of social organization known to our time. Its aspiration to
universal human flourishing is worthy; its principles of respect, equal
treatment, and human dignity are sound. The great, pervasive injus-
135. Or, as Charlesworth and her associates put it, "European, male discourse."
Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 619. The frequency with which radicals use the adjective
"European" derisively is bewildering. I suspect this is a renewed form of the sentimental
prejudice that the Third World is simple, noble, and oppressed, while the First World is
sophisticated, evil, and imperialistic.
136. See generally Amnesty International, supra note 37.
137. Charlesworth et al., supra note 1, at 618 (emphasis added).
138. Of course, I am far from suggesting a correlation between Third World and tyranny.
While there may be now a very high correlation between Western societies (including here
most of the former Soviet republics) and liberalism, the reverse is not true: a rapidly growing
number of Third World states are liberal. Also, some culturally Western states are part of the
Third World in terms of their economic development.
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tices of the present arise not from liberalism, but from illiberal alter-
natives, and, sometimes, from the lack of resolve to press the liberal
vision to its ultimate resolution. Those who would dispirit that
resolve, even while wrapped in banners of liberation, deserve our most
wary and searching scrutiny.
